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Summary:
The problem the economists in the field of renewable resources face is that of
determining and recommending the harvest intensity that will maximize the economic
value to the consuming society and also maximize the producers' surplus at a level
of production in perpetuity.
The optimal control theoretic approach was employed in this paper to theoreti-
cally answer this problem within the framework of a one country-one renewable resource
with economy of size of resource population.
In order to derive quantitative as well as qualitative results, a quadratic objec-
tive function-linear population-harvest dynamics model and a quadratic objective func-
tion-quadratic population-harvest dynamic model are solved for the optimal harvest
paths over time.
A general conclusion is that if the initial resource population is smaller than
the target population to be determined in the text, the present harvest intensity must
be curtailed to an extent that the resource population can grow to a level that can
sustain the optimal or target harvest. This establishes a principle of conservation of
renewable resources. In this case, a government regulation over the total harvest is
supported. In case the initial population is already greater than the target population,
the competitive harvest is proved to be the optimal harvest. Detailed analyses of the
economy of size effects and the future discount rate effects are presented.
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Dynamic Theory of Renewable Resource Economics
with Economy Population of Size;
Optimal Control Theoretic Approach
T. Takayama*'> and M. Simaan-^*'-
Introduction
Renewable resources such as fish, whale, deer, forest, etc., con-
stitute an increasingly important class of economic resources for the
sustenance and improvement of human welfare on this planet, Earth.
The common characteristics of these resources are (1) that they
are for direct human consumption, and (2) that they can reproduce themselves
with a specific speed of renewal given a specific environment.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic theory of renewable resource
economics that takes these common characteristics into consideration to
establish principle of conservation of this class of resources. Other im-
portant theoretical as well as practical results in this field are obtained.
Since this class of resources embraces a large number of animals,
fish, trees, etc., we deal with them as one species, namely, "fish" in this
paper, without loss of substance.
The problem the renewable resource economists face could be summa-
rlzedas that of determining and recommending the intensity of withdrawal
(harvesting) that will maximize the economic value to the consuming societies
*This work was partially supported by the Ford Foundation Grant lEO
#750-0111.
**Professor of Economics, University of Illinois, at Urbana-Champaign.
***Associate Professor of the Department of Electrical Engineering at
the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA.

and also maximize the producers' prof it, surplus at a level of production
In perpetuity, if it exists at all. Stated differently and narrowly,
some economists consider the following questions are of (theoretical) im-
portance; "(1) What is the optimal rate at which to withdraw fish? (2)
Why might the maximum sustainable yield not be optimal? (3) How do optimal
and competitive behavior differ? and (k) Under what conditions will extinc-
tion occur?" [Peterson and Fisher (1976) [l]]. There are many other questions
that are of practical and theoretical importance. Such questions are: (5)
Is catch regulation necessary (this is actually related to (3) above, and
this will be duscussed fully later)? (6) Is mesh control regulation neces-
sary? (7) What is the optimal catch when economy of size of fish population
exists? and (8) What are the effects of the two hundred miles territorial
waters limit on these questions raised above?
Even though the last question is of overwhelming importance at this
stage of development of international regulations over the Intensity of the
catch of fish, it lies outside of the range of the tool that we employ in
this paper. However, In the near future we plan to grapple with this ques-
tion by using the differential game theoretic approach [ lOJ^
As will be revealed later, question (7) embraces questions (1), (3),
and (^), and our theoretical Investigation in this paper will be completed
if the questions (2), (6), and (7) are answered.
In the next section we formulate our renewable resource economics
problem as that of maximization of the social pay-off subject to fish popu-
lation-catch dynamics and briefly discuss some general properties of the
optimal catch, population, and other related variable, the Lagrangian.
In Section 2 we employ a quadratic social pay-off functional which
We avoid our own review of the existing literature In this field.
The reader Is referred to a comprehensive review by Peterson and Fisher [l].

3contains the economy of size effect (for empirical implications of tfiis
effect, see [11]) in its industry supply functional, and a linear first-
order fish population-catch dynamics, and within this framework we answer
the three questions analytically and quantitatively.
In Section 3, the same social pay-off functional as in the previous
section is used, but the population-catch dynamics is assumed as quadratic
in population. Properties of the optimal catch paths such as multiple
equilibria and the related convergence patterns (co-existence of a monotone
stable or unstable convergence and a cyclical asymptotic convergence) are
pointed out in relation to Samuelsonian "universal cycles" [A]. Policy
implications of the conclusions derived from this model are discussed.
In conclusion, we summarize the results and point to future research
topics and directions.
1. Dynamic Formulation of Renewable Resource Economics
Problem with Economy of Population Size
We conceive that the renewable resource population follows a typical
dynamics of the form
(1.1) p = f(p, X, t) , p(0) = Pq given
where
p denotes the population (more clearly, the unit must be expressed
in pounds or tons of the resource at or older than the recruitable
age)
,
p denotes the time derivative of the population,
X denotes the intensity of catch or harvest of the resource, and
t denotes the real time over which the population and catch are
moving and measured.
In this paper we assume that the function f(p(t), x(t) , t) can be
separated into the following two parts:

A(1.2) f(p(t), x(t), t) = g(p(t), t) - x(t')
where g(t(t), t) Is usually expressed as a function of p(t) only, g(p(t)).
and p = g(p(t)) itself is called the biological growth law [l]. However,
In due recognition of the fact that the population of a renewable economic
resource cannot be observed and measured without interference of human
endeavor for harvesting the resource, we write (1.1) via (1.2) as
(1.3) P= g(p(t)) - x(t),^ p(0) = Pq given.
The society (or societies treated as an integrated single body In
this paper) is considered to maximize its objective. We define the objec-
,SP(p,x),
tlve of our model as the present value of social pay-of f* (or the sum of the
consumers' and producers' surpluses) over the time horizon [O, T), T > 0,
following the market-oriented formulation of Samuelson [3] and Takayama [S
,
10]. That is, the society is assumed to maximize
T. X.
(1.4) TSP(p, x) E ^W^^ n^d^^' t) - P^(p, C, t)}d5dt. X
/l-t L
j -rt SP(p,x)dt
Jo
"
where " "^
P,(^, t) is the market demand function of the catch (= consumption)
5 up to X and time at t, and expresses the dollar value of the fish consumed,
and P (p, 5, t) denotes the industry supply function of the catch time, and
the fish population level. The introduction of p In the industry supply func-
tion is a reflection of "economy of population size" that this industry can
enjoy relative to the Increasing size of the resource.
We now define our dynamic renewable resource economics problem with
economy°population size as
A
2
Hereafter, unless otherwise stated or special emphases are needed
to do so, the time, t. In p(t) and x(t) (and other variables that may be
introduced later) will be omitted.

and
Problem : Find x*(t) that maximizes (l.A) subject to (1.3), p ^ 0, x ^0.\
The Hamiltonian for this problem (ignoring p ^ and x ^ at this
stage) can be written as
(1.5) H(p, X, t) = SP(p, x) + X(g(p) --x)
where
A(= X(t)) denotes the costate variable or Lagrangian, Based on
(1.5) we can derive the necessary conditions for the optimal ity of x(t)
as follows:
(1.6)
(i) p = g(p) - X, p(0) = Pq given
(m) X= (r -^)X - ^
(iii) pf. - X =
dX
(iv) X(T) = or lim e"'"*^X(t) =0.
From (1.6, iii) we can identify the costate variable X as the
discrepancy between the market value (price) of the unit resource and the
cost of producing or harvesting the same by an individual producer in the
Industry, that is,
(1.7) X(t) = P^(x(t)) - P^(p(t), x(t), t).
Thus, if X(t) is found to be positive for an optimal harvest path
or trajectory x*(t) for any finite t, then one can state that until the
target population p" or target catch x''^ when t tends to infinity is reached,
a total catch or harvest control regulation must be implemented to protect
the resource from being privately exploited. We discuss this point in more
detail in the next section.
The external economy effect is reflected in the 9SP/9p term in (1.6,
ii) and also 3SP/8x term. In the next section we will fully discuss this
effect when we explicitly solve our quadratic-linear optimal control prob-
lem with economy of size of the resource population.

6Instead of using a phase-diagram in p - X space of the Quirk and
Smith type [2], we have shown that the population-catch (= harvest)
relationships can be best illustrated on a phase-diagram in p - x space
[7» 9]. For this purpose, one can derive x = h(p, x) function from (1.6),
and trace out optimal trajectories d iagramat leal ly if no analytical solu-
tion is avai lable
Figure 1. Phase-Diagram in P - x Space with Two Equilibria.
In Figure 1 a nonlinear population-catch dynamics and a nonlineo-
(x =)h(p, x) function are used to heuristically derive dynamic trajector, .-
on the p - X space. More detailed analyses of a problem falling in this
category will be made in Section 3 of this paper.
One characteristic that mal<es optimal control theoretical approach
attractive is its capability of answering practical real-life problems
quantitatively. In the next section, we will turn to this type of problem
formulation that renders analytical solutions and conclusions on which
policy decision makers can base decisions.
2. A Quadratic Social Pay-off-Linear Population-Harvest
Dynamics Formulation with Economy of Size
in order to see clearly and quantitatively, the conditions under

7which the optimal catch does exist, their quantitative results and the
qualitative implications, we new turn to a quadratic, market-oriented formu-
lation of our social pay-off function and linear population-catch dynamics
case.
As a basis of constructing the quadratic social pay-off function,
let us assume that the market-demand function and the industry supply
function take the following form: demand function
(2.1) P,(x) = a - Bx
d
where a > and 3 > 0, and supply function
(2.2) P^(p, x) = y - wp + Gx
where y > 0, w > 0, and > 0.
Here, in (2.2), we assume that the (instantaneous) supply function shifts
to the right as the fish population increases.
Now the social pay-off function can be written as
(2.3) T5P(P, x) = / e"''^{(a - ii)x -
~(B + 0)x^ - wpx}dt.
The linear population-catch dynamics is expressed as
(2.4) p = a + bp - x, p(0) = p- given,
where a ^ 0, and b > are assumed.
We can now formulate our problem as:
Problem Q - L : Find x*(t) that maximizes (2.3) subject to {2.k)
,
' '
" ' w
X ^ 0, and p ^ 0.
The necessary conditions accompanying the optimal ity of x*(t) are:

(2.5)
(i) p = a + bp - X, p(0) = Pq given
(ii) X = -(b - r)A - wx
;iii) (a - y) - (6 + 0)x wp - X =
(iv) X{T) = or lim e'^^Xit) = 0.
It is possible to derive solutions of (2.5) for a finite time horizon case,
and we are planning to develop a computer program to do just this in the
near future. In this paper, however, we solve (2.5) for T = <». The de-
tailed derivation of the solutions is documented in the Appendix at the
end of this paper, and the interested reader is referred to it.
For this problem, Problem Q - L„, there exist two solutions: (i)
an unstable and divergent catch solution, and (ii) a stable, monotonical ly
convergent solution.
The unstable, divergent solution can be expressed in a closed-loop
form as
(2.6) x„ = (2b - rUl - 6) p *^^-^ {^ * (b . S"(b-r)}
a(2b - r)(l - 5)
(2b-r)6 - r
where
(2 « « = V' - (3 . ^y (;,-,) 0)
and is assumed to be positive. That is, we assume that
(2.8) {(6 + 0)(2b-r) > W and b - r >
One can identify this solution as the path of instantaneous social pay-off
maximization.

The accompanying population dynamics can be written as
(2.9)
2(b-r) ( g +
P " " (2b-r)6 - r \ S +
y , aw
-
^
""
(3 + 0)(b ^'
(2b-r)6 + r
which has a positive coefficient for p. (2.9) can be integrated out to
give us the following divergent population growth:
(2.10) p(t) = (p(0) - p^)e (2b-r)(S
-H r
^ ^
w ^ w
where
(2.11) p*=(;
1
w(2b-r)
(e + 0)(b-r)
-]/a + y
-JlB + "
a +
aw
(B + 0)(b^}
This solution, (2.6), is therefore not stable, and unless the initial
condition is already at pi (the optimal catch at this population is the same
as (2.15) and if p. < p" , v/hich is most likely in the case of many fish
u w
species, and especially almost all whale species, the catch strategy (2.6)
will drive the population toward certain extinction.
A stable, monotonical ly convergent catch solution can be expressed
in a closed-loop form as
O 19^ vWnf^U _ (2b-r)(l + 6) _ 2(b-r) ja + M aw \(2.12) x:-(p(t))
5 P
- (2b-r)6 + r WTT ^ (3 + 0)(b-r)fw
+ a(2b-r)(l + S)
(2b-r)6 + r
with the following population dynamics
/o ,,s 2(b-r) ia. + \i aw \
^^•^^' P = (2b~r)6 + r )J1~Q ' ^^(B + 0) (b'^rT/
= 2(b-r) (2b-r)6 - r ^
- (2b-r)6 + r " 2 P
(2b-r)6 - r
where
(2.H) (2b-r)6 - r >
b - r >
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are assumed to guarantee the stability of the population growth and posi-
tivity of the population when t tends to infinity, as the integral of (2.13)
can be written explicitly as
(2.15) p(t) = (p(0) - p^)e
-(2b-r)S ^ r
^ ^
VI i. w
with p* already defined in (2.11).
w
The terminal target population is exactly (2.11), and the corres-
ponding catch is
(2.16) x* =
w
1
w(2b-r)
b(6 + 0)(b-r)
g - y aw /, 2b-r \
FT-9 ^ (6 + 0)(b-r)t^ " b(0+a)(b-r)f
In order to get a clearer picture of this case with economy of
population size, let us compare these results we obtained in this paper
with those without such economy which were already obtained in [9]. The
results without economy of size can also be obtained by driving w to zero
throughout the results obtained in this paper. Thus, since 5 = 1 when
w = 0, we have for (2.6) a singular solution (2.6^) x* = „ ^
which is unstable and drive the population to zero if p_ < p*
where
(^•"'^*"f{KI -^)-
and the population in this case moves along the following path
(2.10-) p(t) = (p(0) - p*)e<^"''^ *= + p:v
which is unstable due to (2.8).
There is a stable optimal catch solution in this case and is
(2.12') x*(p(t)) = (2b-r)p +|-^ (2b-r) L - y _ \b~ \p"T-0 7.
with the corresponding population movement
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(2.15') p(t) = (p(0) - p*)e"^''^''^^ + p^ ,
which is obviously stable due to (2.8).
The target population and catch are (2.11*) and (2.6'), respectively.
In order to facilitate the comparisons between these two situations, one
with economy of size and the other one without it, let us assume that a = 0.
Due to assumptions (2.14) on demand and supply parameters and on the posi-
tive future discount rate, one can conclude
(2.17)
p* > p*
^w
X" > X"
w
!n other words, if economy of size can be expolited by a new fish-
ing technology, then, in the long run, the fish population and the catch in
perpetuity, and eventually the social pay-off will be larger than when the
economy of size is not exploited.
The effect of the size economy expressed by w on the target popu-
lation is positive as long as w satisfies (2,8). To confirm this statement,
take the partial derivative of p'^ with respect to w to obtain
3p*
(2.18) '^8w
zD-r
(8 + 0)(b-r)
b -_
w(2b-r)
(3 + e)(b-r)
.
2^-" (3 4-0)(b-r) '(2b-r)
b-t.(3 + 0)(b-r)i
The sign 3p-/3w depends on the economy of size parameter w; that is,
w
(2.19) 9p:w
^ ^ accord ingly as9w >
(3 + 0)(b-r)(3b-r)
w
2(2b-r)
(g - y)(b-r)
2a
This expression reduces, due to (2.8), to a more positive statement:
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3p*("} Oct's '^
7;— > for any positive w satisfying (2.8), confirming our con-dw
elusion.
Figure 2 below is based on (2.5) (i) and
(2.22) k = j^ {aw + (b-r) (a - y) } -(b-r)x + ^^j^ P,
summarizes the analytical results
which is derived from (2.5), and/of our case with economy of size in p
space in comparison with the case without the size economy.
X
- X
x*
w
xjp(t))
X'''
Figure 2. Stable and Unstable Solution Paths of the Cases
with and without Economy of Size: Ew and E are Two Target
Population-Target Catch Combinations
Based on the analytical results obtained so far, we can now derive
the following conclusions: (i) Under certain conditions the optimal catch
strategy exists and is smaller than the instantaneous social pay-off maxi-
mization catch (competitive behavior [l]) X (p(t)) on EBw, (2.6), which
w
leads the fish population toward extinction. This shows, within the restric-
tion of the model assumptions, that to enjoy a larger social payoff In the
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long run in perpetuity, the society must limit the catch or conserve the
scarce resource.
Another way to reach this conclusion is to utilize (1.7) in rela-
tion to (2.5). Since for any initial population p(0) (< p*)X*(p(t)) > 0,
and as t tends to infinity, X"(p(t)) converges to zero, the marginal social
value of the unit resource is always larger than the marginal individual
cost of producing (catching) the same. This, under competitive assumptions,
especially the free-entry assumption, will drive the catch to x (p(t)), (2.6),
leading the resource population to zero.
This prompts us to conclude that in the field of renewable resource
economy, the catch control regulation must be implemented. This conclusion
answers questions (l), (3), {^) , (5), and (7).
(2) The mesh size control or regulation argument can be advanced
along the line of [9]- The basic reason for our support for this regulation
is that the optimal mesh-size information is external to individual fisher-
men or producers, and for the best benefit of the whole consuming and pro-
ducing society, this information should be disseminated in the form of regu-
lation similar arguments about the methods of harvesting other renewable
resources can be advanced. This answers question ^)f
(3) The effects of the future discount rate on the optimal catch
and target population are not as straight forward as those of the case
without economy of population size. However, the evaluation of the magni-
tude of 8p"/8r indicates that the effect of a larger r is negative; as the
future discount rate increases. In the latter case referred to above,
the future discount rate has no effect on the target catch or population,
but affects the rate of convergence of the optimal catch and the fish popu-
lation related to the catch. More specifically, we concluded [9] that the
larger the rate, the greater the present catch, and thus the slower the
fish population growth.

It is impossible to answer question (2), "Why might the maximum sus-
tainable yield not be optimal?", raised in the Introduction of this paper
by using quadratic-linear model of this chapter. This leads us to a
nonlinear formulation of our populat ion--catch dynamics, and we now turn to
a quadratic social pay-off-quadratic population-catch dynamic model to
answer this question and explore other implications of the model results.
3. A Quadratic Social-Payoff-Quadratic Population-
Catch Dynamic Model with Economy of Size
Economists have been accustomed to the stability arguments of the
general equilibrium theory, and tend to define the dynamics in the first
place and then argue about the stability of this defined system. This is
typically seen in [8], and [k, 5]. Samuelson, later, made one step further
away from this tradition and developed a two species-(predator-prey) -model
into a minimum problem [6]. In this section we develop a quadratic-
quadratic model with economy size, and point out, in this more general case,
that the maximum sustainable yield cannot be optimal, and then show a way
of generalizing the Samuelsonian universal cycle theory.
The social pay-off function can be defined exactly the same as
(2.3) , that is
T
(3.1) SP(p, x) = /"e"""^ |(a - y)x - i(3 + e)x^ - wpx} dt.
The fish population-catch dynamics that this society ought to observe
conscientiously can be written as
2
(3.2) p = f (p, x) = a + bp - cp - X, p(0) = Pq given,
where a ^ and b, and c are assumed to be positive constants.
The society is assumed to maximize the social pay-off, (3.1),
constrained by the dynamics equation (3.2). Within this framework we
define our dynamic optimization problem as:

J5
Problem Q - : Find x*(t) that maximizes (3.1) subject to (3.2),
p 2; and X ^ 0.
The necessary conditions accompanying the optimal ity of x(t) are:
(i) p = a + bp - cp - X, p(0) = Pq given
(ii) X = - (b - r - 2cp)X - wx
(iii) (a - y + wp) - (B + 0)x - X =
(iv) X(T) = or lim e"'''^A(t) =
t-*oo
(3.3)
By differentiating (iii) with respect to time t and eliminating X,
X, and p (using (i) and (ii)), one can get (see [7] for a formula).
(3.M
X = ^j^-g- [aw + (b-r) (a - y) + {(2b-r) - 2c (a - y) } p - 3cwp
3 +
+ 2c($ + 0)px - {(b-r) (6 + 0) + 2w} x] = h(p, x)
The quadratic equations represented by
(3.5) f(p, x) = a + bp - cp^ - X =
and
(3.6) h(p, x) = 0,
once solved simultaneously for x* and p" will give us the steady-state
solutions at which the system may be stable or unstable. There are, in
general, three solutions for the pair of equations above. All three
solutions may be imaginary, or real, or any combination of these extremes,
Equation (3-5) is a parabola such as shown in Figure 1. While
(3.6) can be expressed by the following rectangular hyperbola
/, y^ _ aw + (b-r) (g - y) + A{(b-r)(B + 0) + 2w} /2c (g + 0)
^^•'' "" (b-r)(B + 0) + 2w - 2c(6 + 0)P
with A defined in (3.9) below and with the fol lowing two axes;
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A vertical axis represented by
(t R\ n - (b-r)(g + 0) + 2w(3-^^ P 2c(3 + e)
—
and another axis represented by
(3.9) X = -
Ub-r) - 2c(a ~ y) - ^-|i^ {(b-r) (B -^ 6) f 2w}
2c(B + e)
,
3w _ A 3w
2(6 + 0)P~ "2c(6 + 0) 2(8 + or '
The most likely cases are
(a) The numerator in (3.7) is negative, or
(b) The numerator in (3.7) is zero, or
(c) The numerator in (3-7) is positive and p In (3.8) is positive,
A in (3-9) is negative, and the coefficient of p in (3.9) is positive.
It is almost certain that the maximum sustainable yield (M's in
Figure 3) is not the optimal population or the optimal catch. This answers
question(2)raised in the introduction.
In Figure 3(A), E. is a saddle-point-like equilibrium point similar
to those we dealt with in Section 2 of this paper. E„ and E_ are asymptoti-
cally stable equilibrium points similar to E in Figure I. In Figure 3
(A'), E is an asymptoticaHy unstable equilibrium point.
In Figure 3(B), E, is like E^ in Figure 3(A), and E„ is like E.
In Figure 3(A)
.
In Figure 3(C), E. and E„ are saddle-point-like equilibria.
,
and E_ is a stable equilibrium. Figure 3(C) shows only one saddle-point-
l ike equi
1
ibrium.
A feature clearly different from the results we obtained in the
or divergent
previous model is the asymptotically (cyclically) converge ngvatch paths
or even a limit cycle
generated by this model. For instance, in Figures 3(A), (A'), or (B) , we
A
have one such equilibrium. In Figures 3(A) or (B) , if the initial fish
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p
1 P \ P
Figure 3. Phase-Diagrams and Possible Optimal Paths of Problem Q-Q^.
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population is smaller than p the stable monotonical ly converging path
will lead the catch-population to E. . However, if the initial population
is greater than p , say p^ , then a completely different path will lead the
catch-population toward E with ever oscillating movements around E„. A local
limit cycle is also a possibility CsJ .
As a limiting case of Problem Q - Qw we can construct a model with
a quadratic social pay-off function without economy of size and a quadratic
population-fish dynamics (Problem Q - Q) . As one can easily prove that the
phase-diagram can be constructed by the following p - x dynamics:
(3.10) (i) p = a + bp - cp - X, p(0) = Pq given
(ii) X = (b-r)
( e + "7
g - yi
a + G
Figure k. Equilibria of Problem Q - Q and Optimal
Catch-Population Character ist ics
.
By setting x = 0, we have a familiar expression already derived elsewhere
[9]. In this case, E^ equilibrium possesses a similar stability and in-
stability properties as a saddle-point-like equilibrium point. However,
E_ exhibits a completely stable equilibrium. For instance, if the popula-
tion is greater than pf , the optimal catch is exactly the same as the
"competitive" catch. As the industry maintains this competitive catch, the

population monoton I ca 1 1 y converges to p* along bTE- . If the population is
beyond p* (but smaller than P) , the optimal catch will be still the compe-
titive catch, which will bring the population to pt along B.E- path.
Thus BTf
-
, and B,^- paths are for the resource population abundance
case. Due to the lack of economy of size, the target catches are exactly
the same irrespective of the population as long as it lies in between P^ and P
In contrast to Problem Q - Q , no oscillating, asymptotic convergence is
observed. The comparison above reveals that the asymptotically stable path
converging to E_ is also a competitive path. Thus, in the case in which the
population is already large enough and the population-catch dynamics exhibits
an absolute decreasing return to scale, the optimal catch coincides with the
competitive catch.
It may be almost impossible to solve (3.3) for clean analytical
solutions. However, for practical problems falling in this category, graphi-
cal methods or some other methods may be available to derive the optimal
trajectories.
This model clearly points out a way of generating a Voltera-Lolka
type differential equations system extensively treated by Samuelson [k , 5, 6].
A prey is a prey, and follows its own population dynamics (although this
population dynamics itself may depend on how the predator catches it--
mesh-size regulations, hunting regulations, etc. (for further discussion see
[9]). The predator catches the prey with certain technology and related
cost. And, finally, the consuming society pays for the prey to enjoy the
social benefit. Naturally, a large number of cases may emerge if we care-
fully investigate individual preys—human consumption relationships. Even-
tually, we may be able to identify where the fish population is located on the
p axis, what are the market demand and supply relationships, etc. to deter-
mine and recommend at what intensity should harvest our scarce, renewable
resource, and how to adjust the catch intensity so that we will be able to
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enjoy the maximum social benefit in the long run.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a dynamic model of renewable re-
source economics with economy of size of resource population, and solved
one model with a quadratic social pay-off function and a linear populatio;'-
catch dynamics. We have also attempted to analyze a model with a quadratic
social pay-off function and a quadratic population-catch dynamics.
Several conclusions v;ere drawn within the framework of our models.
and they will be summarized below.
1. As the socially most desirable catch or harvest intensity indicates,
the total catch or harvest must be regulated and controlled along the o;^ti-
mal catch trajectory, due to the clear-cut discrepancy between the margi-- .
social value product (market price) of a unit of the resource and the mar-
ginal individual cost of producing the same.
2. The larger the effect of economy of size (Problem Q - L ), the larger
the target resource population and the target catch (if the society fcllovv?
the optimal catch trajectory).
3. The so-called "conpetitive" cotch is alvjays larger than the socially
optimal catch, and eventually leads the resource population to sure extir.
,
1 1 on
.
k. The effects of the future discount rate on the target population and
the target catch are nil when there is no economy of size, but is most
likely negative with economy of size, however, the larger future discount
rate increases the present catcli and delays the convergence of the popula-
tion to the target population, in the no economy of size case. In the
economy of size case (Problem Q - L ), the effects are not definite.
w
5. Other conclusions such as the need for mesh-size regulations or those
related to catch or harvest methods must be implemented due mainly to the

21
fact that the information of such a technical nature is external to the
Individual producers.
6. The maximum sustainable yield is not likely for the (steady-state)
optimal target catch (Problem Q - L or Problem Q - Q )
.
7. Our nonl inear model (Problem Q - Q ) suggests that there are (steady-
state) equilibrium points other than the saddle-point-like equilibrium
point (Problem Q - L ). Oscillating, asymptotically stable , or unstable
equilibrium or even a limit cycle can coexist with the other.
The dynamic optimal control formulations of renewable resource
economics, developed in this paper, open up various avenues to future re-
search in this field.
A natural extension of our single resource-single country formulations
is a multiple resources -single country formulation. Another extension is a
single resource (or multiple resources) -mult
i
pie nations formulation. A
one fish species-two countries formulation has been attempted and some
results have been obtained in [10], when there is no size economy. This
can be extended to the case in which economy of size exists.
It goes without saying that it Is more to the satisfaction of many
theorists and practitioners of economics J_f_ ^'^^ quadratic-linear form can
be generalized and still obtain rich quantitative results. We can strive
for It, and here we have an ever increasing need for interdisciplinary work
ahead of us.
Fisheries theorists and technicians, those in forestry science,
other disciplines related to renewable resources, economists specializing
or interested in these fields, optimal control theorists, differential
game theorists and practitioners in these fields, and policy decision makers
in these fields, can work together to make regulations and controls in these
areas technically, economically, and politically viable and sound.
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Append ix
The Hamlltonian of Problem Q - L is defined as
w
1 2
H = (a - y)x - 7r(3 + Q)x + wxp + A(a + bp - x) .w /
The necessary conditions for the optimal ity of the catch x are given by
(2.5) or
(i) p = a + bp - X, p(0) = Pq given
(i i) X = -(b-r)X - wx
(ifi) (a - TJ) - (B + 0)x - X =
(iv) X(T) = or lim e"''^X(t) =
(A.l)
Assuming the closed-loop (feedback) control of the following form
(A. 2) X = Kp + E
hold, we can derive the following identity:
{k + bK - K^ + (b-r)K -
-^1^^ }p + E + (b-r)E - KE + aK
-
Q ^ Q {aw + (b-r) {a
- y) }= .
(for detailed derivation procedures, see [?])•
Assuming K(t) and E(t) converges to some constant as t tends to
infinity, that is K = 0, E == 0, v^e get the following two equations:
'(i) -K^ + (2b-r)K - i|^^ =
(A. A) \
P + fc)
:ii) (b-r)E - KE + cK - g-—^ |(b-r) (a - y) - aw} = .
i.
Solving (A.A)(i), we get
(A.5)
.
and
(ii) K2 =^
~V 'V -(6 + oHZb-r)}

E, and E„ , below, are obtained by solving (A.A)(li) by using
K, and K^, respectively
a(2b-r)(1
'l (2b-r)5 + r
(A. 6)
_
_
+ 5) 2(b-r) (/a - y \ . aw )
t,
-
-r^. ^r-
- (2b-r)6 + r\\& + 6/ (g + 0) (b-r)/
and
E_ =
a(2b-r)(l - 6) 2(b-
(2b-r)6 - r T2b
( r) / /a - \i \ aw \
-r)6 - r ^6 + 0/ (6 + 0)(b-r)/
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By using K. and E^, we get X"(p(t)), (2.12), and K^ and E- result in x in
(2.6). p and p* expressions corresponding x*(p(t)) and x. are easy to obtain,
w w
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